Abstract
The purpose of this article is an extension of Shapley's value for games with restricted cooperation. The classical model of cooperative game where every subset of players is a feasible coalition may be unrealistic. The feasible coalitions in our model will be the convex sets, i.e., those subsets of players belonging to a convex geometry L. In the last section, we apply this model to several examples about the power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.
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