Abstract

AbstractThe first results in proof theory were obtained using axiomatic systems of logical deduction. The chapter develops propositional and predicate logic in such an axiomatic system. It shows how reasoning under assumption can be regained in an axiomatic system by proving the so-called “deduction theorem” propositional logic (and later, predicate logic as well). The deduction theorem provides the opportunity to introduce one of the main tools needed for proving properties of formal systems, namely, proof by induction on the natural numbers. The differences between minimal, intuitionistic, and classical systems of logic according to the properties of negation characterizing each of the systems are outlined. Independence of theorems such as the law of excluded middle are here given model-theoretically (in later chapters, these are also presented proof-theoretically). After presenting classical predicate logic, the systems of classical and intuitionistic arithmetic are presented. Gentzen’s first substantial result, the so-called Gödel-Gentzen translation, is discussed in the final section where it is proved that if intuitionistic arithmetic is consistent, so is classical arithmetic.

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