Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919–1939 by Maurer Maurer

Abstract

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 1075 Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919—1939. By Maurer Maurer. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987. Pp. xxxiii + 626; illustra­ tions, maps, notes, glossary, appendixes, bibliography, index. $29.00. The development of military and commercial aviation in the interwar years is a subject of major significance that, ironically, has not received the attention that is its due. Eclipsed by the more alluring pioneering days before and during World War I and by the ominous adulthood of “air power” in the years after 1939, the interwar period has rarely been seen as more than the overromanticized “golden age of flight,” a time of brightly colored biplanes, daredevil barnstormers, and nascent airlines and air forces. Instead, as Maurer Maurer points out in this important book, that period marked a critical stage in the evolution of aviation technology, the aircraft industry, and both military and civilian aeronautical activities. Maurer’s book is structured according to the three “phases” of U.S. military aviation development in the interwar years: the period of the Army Air Service (1919-26), the Army Air Corps (1926-33), and the little-known and underappreciated “General Headquarters Air Force” (1933—39). Within this general structure he examines a broad range of issues, including force structure, developments in engineer­ ing and technology, training, logistics, establishment of air routes and operational services, relations with other services and with the civilian world, pioneer exploratory Hights, war games and military planning, and preparation for future wars. Overall, his book confronts four subjects: adjusting to the post-Armistice world and building on America’s (not altogether laudable) wartime aeronautical experience; establishing an air corps within the army and equipping it with well-trained personnel and suitable aircraft; coping with the Great Depression and, at the same time, confronting the expanding tech­ nical challenges of the late 1920s and early 1930s; and, finally, laying the ground- and air work for a combat-worthy (and genuine) “air force.” Maurer has written an impressive and, indeed, exhaustive book that is meticulously documented by reference to a plethora of primary sources. Along the way he relates many a relevant anecdote or insight, always without succumbing to the temptation to enshrine the past. (For example, his discussion of the Billy Mitchell controversy— pp. 113—29—is forthright and succinct, a genuine “warts and all” presentation.) The book offers us an in-depth accounting of Ameri­ can military aviation development that, quite simply, has been lacking up to this time. Though written in an often dry manner, it furnishes a wealth of information of interest to historians of technology, 1076 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE particularly on the incorporation of new aviation technology into the army, development of radio navigation aids, and the training and establishment of a technologically oriented “new” military service. His discussion of the airmail crisis of 1934 is the best short account that has yet appeared, and is admirably annotated by reference to key documents. The book is not without some small flaws. Maurer has many excellent sections on various war games and exercises but very little to say about how these subsequently influenced strategic and tactical thought and operational planning. Doctrine is likewise mentioned only in passing. The interest of airmen in lessons from foreign wars (notably the war in Spain and the Sino-Japanese war) is not men­ tioned, even though a substantial body of documentation exists that indicates such information was of acute interest to military planners. His discussion of air racing fails to indicate the very real importance that racer aircraft had for future design developments; they were (to use a modern term) the “technology demonstrators” or the “X-series” of their day. Finally, I quibble with his implied criticism of F. Trubee Davison, President Hoover’s assistant secretary of war (for air) be­ cause he was disliked by both partisan airmen and dedicated ground officers. Davison was somewhat like James Forrestal after 1945: the fact that he came under criticism from various camps should be taken as evidence that he was doing his job in a remarkably fair and evenhanded way. But all of these are very small criticisms indeed. Maurer...