Autonomy's Substance

Fabian Freyenhagen

doi:10.1111/japp.12133

Abstract

AbstractIn this article, I argue that autonomy has to be conceived substantively in order to serve as the qualifying condition for receiving the full set of individual liberal rights. I show that the common distinction between content‐neutral and substantive accounts of autonomy is riddled with confusion and ambiguities, and provide a clear alternative taxonomy. At least insofar as we are concerned with liberal settings, the real question is whether or not the value(s) and norm(s) implied by an account of autonomy are acceptable to reasonable people, not whether these accounts are content‐neutral, procedural or input‐focused. Finally, I demonstrate how substantive constraints are compatible with, or even implied in, the notion of autonomy at play in (Rawls's) political liberalism. Overall, I present a normative reconstruction, clarification, and internal critique of liberalism, drawing on case law and statutes from England and Wales.

Highlights

In this article, I argue that autonomy has to be conceived substantively in order to serve as the qualifying condition for receiving the full set of individual liberal rights
I show that the common distinction between content-neutral and substantive accounts of autonomy is riddled with confusion and ambiguities, and provide a clear alternative taxonomy.At least insofar as we are concerned with liberal settings, the real question is whether or not the value(s) and norm(s) implied by an account of autonomy are acceptable to reasonable people, not whether these accounts are content-neutral, procedural or input-focused
It has become a commonplace to distinguish between content-neutral and substantive accounts of autonomy.[1]. This distinction is treated as synonymous, or at least partially overlapping, with the distinction between procedural and substantive accounts.[2]. These respective distinctions are deployed in the context of arguments to the effect that substantive accounts are not fit for the purpose of fixing the threshold at which adults are granted the full set of liberal rights

Summary

Introduction

I argue that autonomy has to be conceived substantively in order to serve as the qualifying condition for receiving the full set of individual liberal rights. I suggest that, at least insofar as we are concerned with liberal settings, the real question is instead whether or not the value(s) and norm(s) implied by an account of autonomy are acceptable to reasonable people, not whether they are content-neutral or -partisan, procedural or non-procedural, input- or output-focused.

Results

Conclusion