Autonomous Tax Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Case of the Uganda Revenue Authority

Abstract

According to standard New Public Management propositions a (semi) autonomous revenue authority is a remedy for many problems that plague the public sector, such as multiple layers of principals and agent, Byzantine rules, low pay, and poor and distorted incentives, which all contribute to unfair and inefficient revenue collection. The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), established in 1991, is the oldest of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa. The analyses presented in this article indicate that URA autonomy initially increased but later declined. Paradoxically, real autonomy attracts political and bureaucratic attention that may, in turn, undermine it. Thus the decline in the URA's autonomy has come both from below, with the loss of the agency's legitimacy from the perspective of taxpayers, and from above, with a loss of formal and informal authority vis-à-vis the Ministry of Finance and state elites. The President's role in the decline of URA autonomy has been especially significant. That of donors has been ambiguous—strengthening the agency's autonomy in some respects, weakening it in others. In addition, autonomy has been eroded as a consequence of declining staff motivation and clientelistic personnel practices. Revenue collection has suffered as a result.