Autonomous rectification behavior of coal mine safety hazards under a gambling mind: From an evolutionary game perspective

Abstract

Safety supervision is an important approach for urging coal mining enterprises to ensure safe production. However, in the face of safety supervision, different interests have a gambling mind for their own benefit, which leads to a loss of risk identification. Moreover, the literature on the analysis of coal mine safety supervision through game methods mainly focuses on how to improve the intensity of supervision. Additionally, research on evolutionary game analysis that considers a gambling mind and research that distinguishes between levels of supervisory intensity are lacking. Therefore, this paper takes the main stakeholders involved in the mine safety supervision, namely, the government supervision departments and the coal mining enterprises as research objects. An evolutionary game model is established. The gambling mind, supervisory intensity, joint liability and other factors are considered in the proposed model. Moreover, this paper also conducts a numerical simulation of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to propose methods for coal mine safety supervision procedures based on the analytical results. The simulation results show that improving the risk identification ability of coal mining enterprises is the key factor for urging coal mining enterprises to take the initiative to rectify safety hazards and avoid accidents. Increasing the frequency of supervision without increasing the penalties can also make the system stable in the optimal state for a long period of time. Increasing joint liability is not conducive to the game system maintaining stability, and has no impact on the supervisory efficiency of government supervision departments. The research results hold great theoretical and practical significance for improving the safety and process management of coal mining enterprises.