Autonomous Constitutional Bodies as new limits to Mexican presidentialism A constitutional and political debate

Abstract

This research discusses the role that Autonomous Constitutional Bodies (OCAs in Spanish) play within presidentialism in the Mexican political system. We start briefly from the evolution of the liberal state, the classic triad on the separation and division of powers and its recent evolution in Mexico until the transition to democracy in 2000. Later, it will be analyzed from a constitutional and political view, one of the main Mexican constitutional innovations that paved this path with the creation of the OCAs, which facilitated the loss of constitutional powers of the head of State and the end of imperial presidentialism. To facilitate understanding the OCAs and their legal configuration, it will be focused on the Mexican ombudsperson, which is called the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH in Spanish), which well exemplifies the limits of these institutions but also their capacity to modernize and democratize the Mexican State.