Automatic On-Chip Clock Network Optimization for Electromagnetic Side-Channel Protection

Abstract

Commercial electronic design automation (EDA) tools typically focus on optimizing the power, area, and speed of integrated circuits (ICs). They rarely consider hardware security requirements. As such, existing EDA tools often directly or indirectly introduce security vulnerabilities. These security vulnerabilities can later be exploited by attackers to leak information or compromise the hardware root-of-trust. In this paper, we show how traditional EDA tools optimize power, area and speed (PAS) metrics in cryptographic circuits at the cost of introducing vulnerabilities to side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks. To balance hardware security with traditional performance metrics, we propose an automatic tool, called CAD4EM-CLK, to secure ICs against power and electromagnetic (EM) SCA attacks. The tool optimizes clock networks for both traditional design requirements and security constraints. To achieve this goal, we first theoretically analyze and model the relationship between on-chip clock networks and side-channel security. The developed model will then guide the CAD4EM-CLK tool to adjust clock network structures to spread the leakage out temporally, also lower its amplitude proportion, so as to help reduce the leaked information. The proposed automatic tool is then validated on various cryptographic circuits. We use layout-level simulation to assess side-channel leakage and the experimental results prove the effectiveness of our proposed tool for power and EM side-channel protection.