Automated anonymity verification of the ThreeBallot and VAV voting systems

Abstract

In recent years, a large number of secure voting protocols have been proposed in the literature. Often these protocols contain flaws, but because they are complex protocols, rigorous formal analysis has proven hard to come by. Rivest's ThreeBallot and Vote/Anti-Vote/Vote (VAV) voting systems are important because they aim to provide security (voter anonymity and voter verifiability) without requiring cryptography. In this paper, we construct CSP models of ThreeBallot and VAV, and use them to produce the first automated formal analysis of their anonymity properties. Along the way, we discover that one of the crucial assumptions under which ThreeBallot and VAV (and many other voting systems) operate--the short ballot assumption--is highly ambiguous in the literature. We give various plausible precise interpretations and discover that in each case, the interpretation either is unrealistically strong or else fails to ensure anonymity. We give a revised version of the short ballot assumption for ThreeBallot and VAV that is realistic but still provides a guarantee of anonymity.