Abstract
Cryptographic protocols such as IKE, SET, TLS, Kerberos have been developed to secure electronic transactions. However the design of such protocols often appears to be problematic even assuming that the cryptographic primitives are perfect, i.e. even assuming we cannot decrypt a message without the right key. An intruder may intercept messages, analyse them, modify them with low computing power and then carry out malevolent actions. This may lead to a variety of attacks such as well-known Man-In-The-Middle attacks. Even in this abstract model, the so-called Dolev-Yao model, protocol analysis is complex since the set of states to consider is huge or innite. One should consider messages of any size, innite number of sessions. The interleaving of parallel sessions generates a large search space. Also when we try to slightly relax the perfect encryption hypothesis by taking into account some algebraic properties of operators then the task gets even more dicult. We have developed in Cassis/LORIA team several translation and constraint solving techniques for automating protocol analysis in Dolev-Yao model and some moderate extensions of it. Protocol specications as they
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