Abstract
This study examines the role of autocratic ruling party strength in democratic transitions. While the impact of ruling party strength on regime stability is extensively studied, we know much less about how ruling party strength influences prospects for democratization during regime transitions. Proceeding from recent studies that suggest autocratic incumbents often choose to democratize from a position of strength rather than weakness, I discuss how specific attributes strong ruling party organizations wield can provide autocratic incumbents with incentives and capabilities to lead democratization in the context of regime change. Using original data on organizational characteristics of 161 autocratic ruling parties between 1970 and 2015, I provide the first set of systematic empirical evidence supporting the argument that ruling party organizational features that promote regime durability can simultaneously facilitate the implementation of substantial democratizing reforms by regime elites in a top-down fashion to preempt political opposition.
Highlights
The results are in line with the argument that while ruling party strength decreases the likelihood of a regime change, it increases the likelihood of incumbent-led democratization in autocracies that have experienced a regime change
This study examines the role of autocratic ruling party strength in democratic transitions
Building on existing insights that suggest autocratic incumbents often strategically transition to democracy when the costs of sustaining the autocratic status quo outweigh the costs of democratization (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Riedl et al 2020; Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012), I contend that ruling party strength can facilitate the implementation of democratizing reforms by incumbent elites in a top-down fashion to preempt political opposition in the context of regime change
Summary
Extensive work argues that strong ruling party organizations promote autocratic regime durability by containing conflict among the members of the ruling coalition, co-opting opposition groups, and mobilizing the masses in support of the regime (Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Greene 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010; Magaloni 2006; 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Slater 2010; Smith 2005; Svolik 2012). This study draws on recent explanations that suggest a ruling party’s perceived capacity to influence the distribution of political power in a subsequent democracy lessen incumbents’ imperative to sustain the autocratic rule given an increasing probability of a regime change (Riedl et al 2020; Slater and Wong 2013; Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012; Ziblatt 2017) In this perspective, incumbents strategically implement liberalizing reforms to avoid relatively more costly pathways to regime change (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2005), and when they can rely on a strong ruling party that can ensure their electoral dominance despite of increasingly democratic elections. I present empirical tests that simultaneously estimate regime-strengthening and democratizing effects of ruling parties
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