Autocratic Institutions and Democratic Lessons: Evidence from Egypt

Abstract

How does political experience with institutions under dictatorship influence the preferences political parties and politicians form towards those institutions in democracy? Does such experience influence political elites to create weak institutions amenable to their manipulation or strengthen their resolve to build strong democratic institutions? In a post-cold war context where dictatorships increasingly hold direct, multi-party legislative elections, this question is important for understanding their prospects for democratization and consolidation. I address these questions by studying political support for judicial independence in Egypt using unique elite-level data from an original survey of almost 200 candidates in Egypt’s first democratic parliamentary elections in 2011-2012. Egypt provides a theoretically appropriate case since it has held such direct, multi-party elections since 1976. I find autocratic institutional experience makes parties highly supportive of an independent judiciary but individual politicians less supportive. Despite this, experienced parties are able to successfully influence the institutional preferences of their most experienced and ambitious members towards democratic attitudes. Surprisingly, new parties do not support judicial independence and do not curb their member’s undemocratic inclinations towards courts. Thus, direct autocratic experience with institutions motivated Egyptian political parties to create stronger not weaker democratic institutions.