Author's Response: Next Steps in Japan's "Security Renaissance"?

Abstract

Author’s Response: Next Steps in Japan’s “Security Renaissance”?The range of interpretation expressed in this book review roundtable about Japan's recent policy innovation mirrors other responses I have received since Japan's Security Renaissance was released earlier this year. Scholars and policy analysts from countries almost ranging from A to Z (Australia to Vietnam) have shared reactions with me, particularly to my core framing of past decade as something importantly new for Japan, security renaissance. Both book and phenomenon itself have generated great interest worldwide, and wide array of reactions both negative and positive. Some readers object to what they see as implication that prior to this renaissance something was wrong with Japan: Dark Ages critique, which I seek to address in chapter one. Others, like James Auer in this set of reviews, are not quite convinced that there is something new to this decade that is different from what I describe as the gradual that has characterized Japanese policy for at least two decades prior to 2006. And still others, like Kenneth Pyle, see this renaissance as only start of what they expect to be much more dramatic change to Japan's policies in near term.I am pleased to read that reviewers here endorse core messages of book: that substantial change in Japan's policies has taken place, including during period of Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rule; that this is not all due to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's leadership (although that does play role); and that dramatic change in Japan's international environment, led by China's steady rise, is principal driving factor of this policy innovation. And I am gratified that they collectively found my description of many new Japanese policies that have emerged in past decade as clear and useful-what Nicholas Szechenyi describes as giving reader a window into current policy debates and strategic vision for Japan's future.My reply to this set of critiques will seek to explain further why I see decade from 2006 to 2016 as renaissance in Japan's postwar understanding and action on its needs, as well as to explore likely direction of future developments in Japan's in new Trump-Abe era based on argument I developed in book. In addition, I will address few other points of critique and disagreement about Japan's past and present raised in this set of reviews.I welcome Auer's underscoring of important role that Japan played in latter years of Cold War, time I refer to as gradual awakening of Japan's engagement, which is summarized in chapter two. Auer's own scholarship on this period-as well as Pyle's-greatly informed book; their published works offer much greater nuance and detail on this earlier period, and I highly recommend them to readers who wish to learn more about precursors to Japan's renaissance.I see past decade as different for numerous reasons explained in full volume. One especially important aspect is growing practicality of discussions across political spectrum in three notable areas: primary opposition party's ultimate embrace of U.S.-Japan alliance, an expanded operational role for Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and reform of large number of restrictive practices. When DPJ came to power in historic August 2009 election, this was watershed time in Japan's postwar development. Auer worries about return to past policies in post-Abe world. However, I would maintain that there is no going back because there is no longer large group of elites in any major party who advocate for militarily weak Japan with limited contributions to Japan's only alliance (with United States). Both DPJ and back-in-power Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have demonstrated through their policies that they support increasing capabilities for JSDF, more practical institutional operations for managing these forces, strengthened U. …