Authors' Response: Is There No Resolution in Myanmar's Rohingya Conflict?

Abstract

Authors' Response:Is There No Resolution in Myanmar's Rohingya Conflict? Anthony Ware (bio) and Costas Laoutides (bio) We are deeply grateful to the reviewers of our book Myanmar's 'Rohingya' Conflict for their kind words as well as their in-depth engagement with the material. We are gratified that the reviewers all endorse our central argument, namely that identity politics—in particular, the taing yin tha mythology—is the primary roadblock to peace. Myanmar must move beyond these toxic conceptions of ethnicity and indigeneity and develop a truly Myanmar identity before any lasting and equitable resolution is possible, not only of this conflict but of the many conflicts across the country. That is, however, a very unlikely outcome in the foreseeable future. We appreciate that the reviewers all concur about the complexity and deeply historical nature of this conflict. Gaining an understanding of this complexity and the causes of intractability is an essential first step in any pathway toward effective international engagement. As Katherine Southwick reminds us, in situations like this the "apparent moral clarity tempt[s] us to minimize their political and practical complexity. Yet we know that sustainable solutions cannot gloss over the Gordian knot of history, structural factors, and opportunism that bring about intractable conflict and mass atrocities." These complexities, of course, are the central messages throughout the book. David Steinberg is concerned that in our pursuit of recommendations from our analysis, we err toward offering "unrealistic possibilities, if not optimism." We accept this critique in part as we agree about the improbability of solutions—or even any real progress—being found quickly. We, nonetheless, do find a need to stand with the practitioners, advocates, and engaged locals who work tirelessly for some way forward. The nature of intractability means virtually everything appears irresolvable and any recommendations implausible. As Bruce Matthews noted, "the authors understandably appear to be actually quite skeptical" about whether these recommendations are in any way realistic. Yet, continue to try we must. [End Page 197] We are pleased to see Steinberg expand on the international relations turmoil this conflict is causing for Myanmar and the extent to which Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy are complicit—castigating her for an "egregiously simplistic and even ingenious" defense of the Tatmadaw, "misstating conditions" and making statements that "must rank among the gross understatements of the year." This posture continues, unfortunately, with her and her party's maneuvering regarding repatriation of the Rohingya from Bangladesh, for example, and ingenious misstatements about the degree of implementation of the Kofi Annan–led Advisory Commission on Rakhine State recommendations. Steinberg articulates the view that the charge of genocide against the Rohingya is questionable, while the charge of ethnic cleansing seems apt. Although we took this line of argument in our book, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) report released in August 2018 significantly changes our minds. The report found evidence that the crimes in Rakhine State, and the manner in which they were perpetrated, "were similar in nature, gravity and scope to those that have allowed genocidal intent to be established in other contexts."1 It thus recommended investigations and prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Despite Myanmar not being a signatory to the Rome Statute, in September 2018 the International Criminal Court claimed jurisdiction at least over the deportation of the Rohingya,2 and it has commenced a full-fledged preliminary examination against the Myanmar commander-in-chief and other senior officials. These are very significant findings, which, as Southwick notes, suggest that it is now time to accept "genocidal intent." Indeed, since the release of this report, we have accepted this terminology in several subsequent publications. The evidence is now compelling. Southwick comments that some of our writing seems to imply moral equivalence of the different actors' grievances. This is perhaps unsurprising given our extensive efforts to convey the perspectives of Rakhine and (as much as possible) Tatmadaw/Burman leaders, particularly about some of the deeper fears motivating them. Although Southwick acknowledges that we have clearly and repeatedly stated that the Rohingya have suffered [End Page 198] disproportionately and that the conflict is deeply asymmetric, she highlights a few...