Authority, Deference, and Fair Play

Abstract

This chapter defends the fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment by addressing two further challenges. According to the first challenge, recent revisions to the standard conception of political and legal authority lead to the conclusion that there is no general obligation to obey the law. On this standard account, to have political or legal authority is to have a right to rule, and those subject to authority have an obligation to obey the directives of those who have the right to rule. If this account is faulty, then the connection between political authority and political obligation is neither as straightforward nor as strong as the standard account assumes. According to the second challenge, the problem is not with authority but with what citizens owe to their polities. That is, citizens do have duties with regard to the law, but the weaker duties of respect or deference rather than an obligation to obey. This chapter responds to the first challenge by demonstrating the superiority of the standard account to the so-called service conception of authority and to the second by showing how appeals to respect or deference rely on a belief in political obligation.