Authenticity, Justice, and Virtue in Taylor and Rousseau

Abstract

Can a society embrace authenticity without becoming more unjust? It seems not, but Charles Taylor has argued that, once the dialogical nature of human subjectivity is recognized, it follows that these two, seemingly opposed, ideals can be reconciled in an ethics of authenticity and a difference-accommodating liberal politics. This essay examines Taylor's claims in light of Rousseau's Reveries of the Solitary Walker, in which Jean-Jacques claims to repudiate the dialogicality that Taylor sees as constitutive of human identity. Although the Solitary Walker's experiences largely confirm Taylor's claims about human subjectivity, they do so in a way that suggests the need for a correction to his moral and political conclusions: J Jacques's melancholy reveries epitomize the failure of the radical authenticity Taylor rejects, but they also show that justice and authenticity cannot be reconciled in any soul-and therefore in any society-lacking the quality Rousseau called virtue.