Abstract

In a paper published in 1978 (Needham & Schroeder) we presented protocols for the use of encryption for authentication in large networks of computers. Subsequently the protocols were criticised (Denning and Sacco) on the grounds that compromise of a session key and copying of an authenticator would enable an enemy to pretend indefinitely to be the originator of a secure conversation. This note discusses a solution to the issue.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.