Abstract
The use of modern technology for the Goodwell of human beings especially in medical science is a hot research area. Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS) is very popular in health care services in developed countries where a physician can remotely get patients related information. The security of such information is very critical as its misuse can have adverse effects on the patients' life. The information transmitted over a public channel is protected using authentication protocols. For this purpose, various biometrics-based authentication protocols including Omid et al.'s protocol have been proposed. However, in this article, it has been analyzed that Omid et al.'s protocol is susceptible to user impersonation attack and also fails to protect user identity. Hence, to remedy the problems an improved mechanism is needed to secure the three-factor authentication framework for the practical application. Therefore, a robust and efficient biometrics-based authentication and key agreement protocols for E-Health Services has been proposed. Further, it has been shown through formal and informal analysis that the proposed scheme is provably secure.
Highlights
Due to the recent advancement in telecommunication technology, its usage is at the peak in business as well as services industries like healthcare services
Since Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS) is used to share critical user-related information, securing is of critical importance
Introduced password and smartcard-based schemes were used for user authentication due to smart card dominance
Summary
Due to the recent advancement in telecommunication technology, its usage is at the peak in business as well as services industries like healthcare services. Debiao et al [14] found that the protocol in [13] is exposed to insider and impersonation attacks if the smartcard of the user is either lost or stolen They introduced an improved version of the scheme to remedy the security loopholes of Wu et al.’s protocol. The authors introduced a biometric-based three factor authentication protocol for TMIS It was analyzed by Yan et al [27] proving that this proposal is unable to resist DoS attack. Recently a new proposal came up from Omid and Nikooghadam [28] proving the exposure of Yan et al [27] to impersonation, offline password guessing attacks and non provisioning of forward secrecy. The comparison is based on security requirements, computation, and communication efficiency
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