Aulus Gellius and the semantic analysis of possibilities

Manuel López-Astorga

doi:10.15366/bp2018.18.021

Abstract

Resumen La teoria de los modelos mentales establece que el pensamiento humano es principalmente semantico y que consiste en analisis de las posibilidades a las que las sentencias hacen referencia. La teoria tiene un gran apoyo empirico. No obstante, se puede pensar que, si realmente muestra como la mente humana opera, deberia ser posible hallar textos antiguos escritos por filosofos o logicos cuyos argumentos revelen identificaciones y comparaciones de posibilidades semanticas. En este trabajo, trato de argumentar que, efectivamente, se pueden encontrar textos de este tipo en las fuentes antiguas. En concreto, comento un fragmento de Aulo Gelio en el que esta claro que se realiza un analisis de posibilidades. Palabras clave: modelos mentales, posibilidades, razonamiento, semantica

Highlights

The theory has been described and commented on in several papers (e.g., López-Astorga, 2015a, 2016). Based on those works and papers, it can be said that one of its fundamental features is that it proposes that the analysis of semantic possibilities, which are called ‘models’ by its proponents, is the basic mental process of human reasoning
The main aim of this paper is to argue that what is presented in that fragment is a true analysis and comparison of combinations of semantic models, i.e., a mental process matching the characteristics that the mental models theory attributes to the natural inferential activity when made by naïve individuals, that is, by individuals without logical training
There are other theories too, and one of them that is very important is, for example, the mental logic theory (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien, 2009, 2014; O’Brien & Li, 2013; O’Brien & Manfrinati, 2010), but the strong empirical support that the former has and the great number of aspects related to cognition that it can explain can lead one to assume that it describes the real working of the human reasoning ability

Summary

Introduction

The mental models theory is a very important framework at present. The literature on it is really extensive, and just some relevant works supporting it are, for example, Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2009), Johnson-Laird (2004, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2015), Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002), Khemlani, Lotstein, Trafton, and Johnson-Laird (2015), Khemlani, Orenes, and Johnson-Laird (2012, 2014), Oakhill and Garnham (1996), Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012), Quelhas and Johnson-Laird (2017), and Quelhas, Rasga, and Johnson-Laird (2017). The theory has been described and commented on in several papers (e.g., López-Astorga, 2015a, 2016) Based on those works and papers, it can be said that one of its fundamental features is that it proposes that the analysis of semantic possibilities, which are called ‘models’ by its proponents, is the basic mental process of human reasoning. In this way, the mental models theory rejects the idea that individuals identify the logical forms of the sentences and apply to them formal or syntactic rules. Since the first premise in the previous example is a conditional, following standard logic, it should be possible to apply Modus Ponendo Ponens.

B Ergo either A or B

B B not-B not-B B B not-B not-B

Conclusions