Augustine and Xunzi on Human Dignity and Human Rights: The Worth of Being Human and Its Entitlement to Institutional Measures for Protecting the Access to Human Flourishing

Eun Young Hwang

doi:10.3390/rel11050264

Abstract

While some human rights theorists suggest that the universalistic project of human rights can be consistent only with an individualistic conception of dignity aligned with liberal regimes, there have also been some voices of discontent raised from Christian and Confucian thinkers in favor of incompatibility. I refer to the universalistic position of approaching cross-cultural human rights by focusing on Pogge’s contextualistic universalism and Joas’ universalistic emphasis on the sacredness of person. I show how it is possible to ground the religious foundation of human dignity on self-transcendence (Joas) and the institutional foundation on the capacity for the pursuit of a worthwhile life as flourishing (Pogge). This idea of dignity grounds human rights as the entitlement to institutional measures for securing the access to basic goods for human flourishing (Pogge). When reinterpreting Augustine and Xunzi in light of human dignity and human rights, I tackle two questions, following Pogge and Joas. First, I reinterpret Augustine and Xunzi by showing how human dignity rests on the relative worth of pursuing one’s flourishing distinct from animals and the absolute worth of pursuing flourishing open for self-transcendence, which also entails different ranges of social conceptions of flourishing. I also tackle how this sense of dignity leads to the entitlement to institutional measures for protecting the access to basic goods for human flourishing as the issue of human rights.

Highlights

I reinterpret Augustine and Xunzi by showing how human dignity rests on the relative worth of pursuing one’s flourishing distinct from animals and the absolute worth of pursuing flourishing open for self-transcendence, which entails different ranges of social conceptions of flourishing
Howard and Donnelly tackle this issue as they show human dignity and human rights presuppose a specific conception of liberal regimes
I tackle how it leads to the entitlement to institutional measures for protecting the access to human flourishing as the issue of human rights, which involves protecting the access to basic goods for flourishing

Summary

Introduction

Referring to some recent universalistic accounts of human rights and dignity, I address how both traditions can be reconstructed to contribute to the process of incorporating the normative principles of human rights and dignity into their culture-specific conceptions without failing to do justice to their particular positions. This hope rests on a hermeneutic project that interprets influential traditions and their normative orientations in light of present normative concerns and theoretical elaborations while reflecting on the relevance of their moral reflections While engaging with actual comparisons, I show how their seeming similarities entail fundamental differences that demand contextual, culture-specific approaches in defining human dignity and specifying the contents of rights without denying universalistic orientations

Methodological Frames of Human Rights and Human Dignity for Comparison

Human Dignity and Human Capacity in a Relative Sense and an Absolute Sense

The Access to Basic Goods for Human Flourishing

Conclusions