Auguste Comte and Joseph De Maistre: The System of Positivism as Theocracy

Abstract

Any investigation into the realm of the history of political ideas and political philosophy should, from the very outset, state the assumptions from which it proceeds. For such an investigation is confronted with two tasks, the one predominantly historical, the other predominantly systematic, and particularly the latter is contingent on understanding the political, social and philosophical views and convictions with which the investigator begins his work. It is, of course, obvious that in order to facilitate a contemporary self-appraisal, the history of political ideas clarifies relationships between thinkers, points out and delimits influences, indicates re- or misinterpretations of traditional or rediscovered ideas, measures their effects and traces them up to the present. But the results of these historical efforts unquestionably leave much to be desired. They merely reveal connections and transitions. But a complex of political ideas is always representative of the structure and nature of an historical social body. Whoever studies the history of political ideas will seek to discover as well what the structure of the social body is, how the play of forces within it functions, and with which means it attempts to master the difficulties it encounters. He wants to understand its constitution, which is determined much less by a set of laws than by spiritual forces. But can this be accomplished? It has been asserted that it is not only pointless, but, in fact, wrong to compare the political philosophy of Plato with that of Hobbes, for the ‘state’ with which both philosophical systems are concerned can under no circumstances be considered to be the same thing. Supposedly the Platonic polity is a theory concerning one thing, the Leviathan of Hobbes a theory concerning something else.1 But aren’t we justified in asking whether a minimum of facts underlying the experiences, opinions, demands and counsels of Plato and Hobbes cannot be reduced to a common denominator? Even if we take the fact of historical change into account and are of the opinion that the unity of the concept of the state by no means guarantees the unity of the object denoted, we can hardly doubt that the strange, dynamic complex of sanctions and institutions which we usually call ‘state’ is in fact characterized by its relationship, on the one hand, to the concept of order and its justification in the idea of justice, and, on the other hand, to the possibility of achieving and maintaining this order. We could therefore assume that, in spite of the undeniable change of the formations which have been called states in the course of history, a minimum of functions has remained constant. In the state, there must be a more or less ordered system for forming the public will by which it can adapt and adjust itself to the changing political environment and the varying domestic circumstances. There must be an authority which puts into practice and applies the more or less accepted order through judicial verdict and interpretation. There must be a unity of opinion expressed in customs and mores, in religious commandments and prohibitions and in moral convictions, which form an effective, because reliable, body of sanctions without which no social structure can endure. As a rule, there are also institutions designed to train the oncoming generations to assume responsibility for this body of sanctions and to grow up to accept the fixed expectations which the community has developed into norms. And finally, there is the question of the means by which the unity indespensable to society may be achieved. We have assumed that we are justified in speaking of a constancy of functions and a constancy of the structure of social and political organizations. This assumption underlies our consideration of two such outstanding and influential political philosophers of the 19th century as Auguste Comte and Joseph de Maistre, in the expectation that we shall not only become acquainted with certain relationships within the history of thought, but shall also gain insights into the organizational structure of the social body itself.