Auditors in the Japanese model of corporate governance

Abstract

Japanese auditors have a unique position and power that varies depending on the governance structure chosen by corporations. In Japan, large corporations can have one of three governance structures: a board of statutory auditors that cooperates with the board of directors, a board of directors that has three committees (audit, nomination and remuneration) and a board of directors with a supervisory committee. The research problem assessed in this paper is how the relative position, power and obligations of auditors varies in each of the three corporate governance structures, taking account of the hierarchical nature of corporate culture in Japan. The paper begins by explaining how the introduction of new laws led to auditors acquiring specialist qualifications and playing a more important role in corporations. It then analyses the provisions of relevant legal acts and the literature on Japanese corporate governance and auditors. The position and power of auditors in each structure is assessed, and attention is paid to the difficulties encoun-tered by the adoption of U.S.-style regulations in this area. The comparative analysis shows that in each of these structures there has been a strengthening of the status of auditors, which has increased their influence. The paper contributes to a reduction of the cognitive gap existing in the Polish literature concerning Japa-nese auditors.