Auditor pricing of abnormal income from sales of available for sale securities: evidence from the banking industry

Abstract

We examine the relationship between abnormal income from sales of available for sale (AFS) securities and bank external auditor fees. Prior research finds that income from sales of AFS securities is used to achieve financial and regulatory reporting objectives, helpful in predicting future bank income, and assigned a persistent valuation multiple by investors. Building on prior research that suggests real activities management leads to negative outcomes, we predict and find that auditors respond to abnormal income from AFS securities sales with increases in audit fees and the effect is stronger among high risk (i.e. higher stock return and earnings volatility) banks relative to low risk banks. In additional analyses concerning a bank’s limited flexibility to achieve regulatory capital objectives through managing loan loss provisions, we find evidence of higher audit fees for banks with low regulatory capital and aggressive income-increasing AFS security sales. Among other robustness tests, we find higher audit fees as abnormal income from sales of AFS securities increases among banks with liquidity concerns and those approaching failure. Our findings suggest that auditors interpret abnormal income from AFS securities sales as an indicator of increased client business risk.