Abstract
Abstract This study examines auditor lobbying on seven proposed US accounting standards which affect banks and savings and loan associations. Evidence is provided in support of the Watts and Zimmerman (1982, 1986) theory on auditor lobbying. Watts and Zimmerman (WZ) hypothesise that auditor lobbying is a function of the client-manager position and a set of wealth effect variables. These variables may provide an incentive for auditors to disagree with their clients on proposed accounting issues. The WZ model is modified by including an audit risk variable. Results show that the model is statistically significant and that the identified wealth and audit risk effects are significant explanatory variables of auditor lobbying behaviour.
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