Audit Fees in a Joint Audit Setting

Abstract

This paper uses the uniqueness of the French audit environment to conduct an in-depth study of audit pricing issues associated with the requirement to hire two independent auditors (joint audit). I use a model derived from Simunic's [(1980). The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence. Journal of Accounting Research, 18(1), 161–190] seminal work to examine to what extent audit fees are influenced by the number of Big 4 joint auditors (zero, one, or two). After controlling for well-known drivers of audit fees that are specific to audit client firms (size, complexity, and risk), for governance characteristics and for auditor selection, the paper shows that the decision to hire two Big 4 auditors as joint auditors does not require the payment of a higher Big 4 premium compared to the choice of one Big 4 auditor paired with a smaller auditor, other things being equal. The choice of two Big 4 auditors thus appears to be a rational economic choice for large and international firms.