Abstract

In this article, we investigate the multichannel cooperative spectrum sharing in hybrid satellite-terrestrial Internet of Things (IoT) networks with the auction mechanism, which is designed to reduce the operational expenditure of the satellite-based IoT (S-IoT) network while alleviating the spectrum scarcity issues of terrestrial-based IoT (T-IoT) network. The cluster heads of selected T-IoT networks assist the primary satellite users transmission through cooperative relaying techniques in exchange for spectrum access. We propose an auction-based optimization problem to maximize the sum transmission rate of all primary S-IoT receivers with the appropriate secondary network selection and corresponding radio resource allocation profile by the distributed implementation while meeting the minimum transmission rate of secondary receivers of each T-IoT network. Specifically, the one-shot Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction is introduced to obtain the maximum social welfare, where the winner determination problem is transformed into an assignment problem and solved by the Hungarian algorithm. To further reduce the primary satellite network decision complexity, the sequential Vickrey auction is implemented by sequential fashion until all channels are auctioned. Due to incentive compatibility with those two auction mechanisms, the secondary T-IoT cluster yields the true bids of each channel, where both the nonorthogonal multiple access (NOMA) and time division multiple access (TDMA) schemes are implemented in cooperative communication. Finally, simulation results validate the effectiveness and fairness of the proposed auction-based approach as well as the superiority of the NOMA scheme in secondary relays selection. Moreover, the influence of key factors on the performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed in detail.

Highlights

  • Internet of Things (IoT) devices in the industrial, scientific, and medical domains are working on the crowded free band, coexisting with the wireless technologies operating in this band, e.g., ZigBee, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth, which cannot provide seamless connectivity with the desired quality of service (QoS) [6]

  • It is preferred for the pre-existing primary network to share the licensed frequency band with IoT networks by cognitive radio (CR), which has emerged as an intelligent technology to address the spectrum scarcity issues

  • The auction process is divided into two steps: (1) Secondary cluster heads evaluate the value of the M primary channels, respectively, Vn = v1,n, v2,n, · · ·, vM,n, which is determined by the channel gains and the corresponding non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) power allocation profile

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Summary

Backgrounds and Motivations

IoT devices in the industrial, scientific, and medical domains are working on the crowded free band, coexisting with the wireless technologies operating in this band, e.g., ZigBee, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth, which cannot provide seamless connectivity with the desired quality of service (QoS) [6]. It is preferred for the pre-existing primary network to share the licensed frequency band with IoT networks by cognitive radio (CR), which has emerged as an intelligent technology to address the spectrum scarcity issues. To reduce capital and operational expenditure, sharing infrastructure and radio resources between S-IoT networks and terrestrial-based IoT (T-IoT) networks is an inevitable trend [22], [23]

Related Works
Contributions and Organization
System Model
The Cooperative Matrix
Signal Transmission in The First Temporal Phase
NOMA Signaling in The Second Temporal Phase
THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FORMULATION
VCG AUCTION FORMULATION FOR NOMA SCHEME
The Bids for Secondary Networks
The Winner of The Secondary Network
The Payoffs of VCG Auctions
2: Calculation Process
The Implementation of VCG Auction
SEQUENTIAL VICKREY AUCTION FORMULATION FOR NOMA SCHEME
The Payoffs of the Sequential Vickrey Auction
AUCTION FORMULATION FOR OMA SCHEME
The VCG Auction in TDMA Scheme
2: Sequential auction: 4: The truthful bid calculation
The Sequential Vickrey Auction in TDMA Scheme
SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Payoffs of PRs in Cooperative Spectrum Sharing
The Fairness for Cooperative Spectrum Sharing
VIII. CONCLUSION
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