Attribution of Intentional Causation Influences the Perception of Observed Movements: Behavioral Evidence and Neural Correlates

James W Moore,Naresh Subramaniam,Greg Davis,Christoph Teufel,Paul C Fletcher

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00023

Abstract

Recent research on human agency suggests that intentional causation is associated with a subjective compression in the temporal interval between actions and their effects. That is, intentional movements and their causal effects are perceived as closer together in time than equivalent unintentional movements and their causal effects. This so-called intentional binding effect is consistently found for one’s own self-generated actions. It has also been suggested that intentional binding occurs when observing intentional movements of others. However, this evidence is undermined by limitations of the paradigm used. In the current study we aimed to overcome these limitations using a more rigorous design in combination with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to explore the neural underpinnings of intentional binding of observed movements. In particular, we aimed to identify brain areas sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causality attributed to the observed action. Our behavioral results confirmed the occurrence of intentional binding for observed movements using this more rigorous paradigm. Our fMRI results highlighted a collection of brain regions whose activity was sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causation. Intriguingly, these brain regions have previously been implicated in the sense of agency over one’s own movements. We discuss the implications of these results for intentional binding specifically, and the sense of agency more generally.

Highlights

Hume famously argued that causality cannot be perceived directly but must be inferred based on certain cues such as the temporal contiguity of events (Hume, 1739/1888)
Based on the results of this initial behavioral result coupled with Wohlschläger et al.’s (2003) study, one-tailed t -tests were used for the analysis of intentional binding data collecting inside the scanner
The mean interval estimate in the intentional causal condition (542 ms) was significantly lower than in the unintentional causal condition (560 ms), t (15) = 1.94, p = 0.036. This effect is weaker than that found in the prior behavioral study, it shows that intentional binding does hold for observed movements

Summary

Introduction

Hume famously argued that causality cannot be perceived directly but must be inferred based on certain cues such as the temporal contiguity of events (Hume, 1739/1888). It has been demonstrated that, when an agent is (or believes she is) the cause of an event, this causal representation can shape the way in which the timing of actions and outcomes are perceived: intentional actions, such as an active key press, and their effects, such as a tone, are perceived as closer together in time than equivalent unintentional (passive) movements and their effects (Haggard et al, 2002; Moore and Obhi, 2012) The existence of this “intentional binding” effect indicates that intentional causation is associated with the subjective binding together in time of actions and their effects. The effect reveals an intriguing reversal of the Human relationship between time and causality

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