Attribution of Cause, Responsibility and Blame Among Violent and Nonviolent Individuals

Abstract

Nonviolent philosophy has not been a source of significant theoretical or empirical work within social psychology. What little research exists has examined nonviolence indirectly or primarily as a technique, not as a philosophy or way of life. So for example, several classic studies have investigated, directly or indirectly, people who refused to act violently (Milgram, 1974), did not cooperate with immoral acts (Gamson, Fireman & Rytina, 1974) or bargained in a conflict situation with others who adopted a nonviolent approach (Shure, Meeker and Hansford, 1965). Social science research tells us very little about the moral reasoning and judgment processes that lie behind nonviolent action and are critical to its meaning. Psychologists have studied nonviolence almost exclusively as an instrumental technique; that is, as a bargaining or conflict reduction strategy evaluated by its effectiveness rather than its moral or philosophical meaning. Certainly this lack of research does not preclude nonviolence in whatever form, as a personal philosophy or personality type within our culture. Nonviolence has a long and visible history which provides a unique perspective, or at a minimum, a useful heuristic for examining judgments and beliefs concerning violence. Historical studies (e.g., Texeira, 1987; Pelton, 1974) show that many elements of nonviolent philosophy are evident in western religious teachings and have been the basis for exemplary nonviolent individuals (e.g., Martin Luther King, Caesar Chavez) and groups (e.g., Quakers).