Attribution of attitude as a function of behavioral direction and freedom: Reactance in the eye of the observer

Abstract

In a variation of the Festinger and Carlsmith dull-task paradigm an actor-stooge was given free-choice, forced-compliance choice, or no-choice as to whether he should tell the “waiting subject” that the task was dull or that the task was enjoyable. Crosscutting this three-level manipulation of behavioral freedom was a two-level manipulation of behavioral direction. The actor-stooge either chose or agreed to inform the “waiting subject” that the task was dull or that the task was enjoyable. In agreement with Jones and Davis' theory of correspondent inference observer-subjects made positively correspondent inferences in the free-choice condition, i.e., the actor-stooge was attributed with a more unfavorable attitude toward the task when he chose to advocate the dullness of the task than when he chose to advocate the enjoyableness of the task. However, within the no-choice condition, previously unobtained negative correspondent inference occurred. The actor-stooge was attributed with a more unfavorable attitude toward the task when he was required to advocate the enjoyableness of the task than when he was required to advocate the dullness of the task. These later results were interpreted as indicating that the observers attributed reactance to the actor-stooge in the condition in which the most social pressure was exerted. A second experiment demonstrated that the negative correspondence effect was not due to assumptions regarding other subjects' preference and also demonstrated the dependence of the effect on the absence of a rationale for the no-choice assignment of behavioral direction.