Attitudinal analysis of vaccination effects to lead endemic phases

Abstract

To achieve endemic phases, repeated vaccinations are necessary. However, individuals may grapple with whether to get vaccinated due to potential side effects. When an individual is already immune due to previous infections or vaccinations, the perceived risk from vaccination is often less than the risk of infection. Yet, repeated rounds of vaccination can lead to avoidance, impeding the establishment of endemic phases. We explore this phenomenon using an individual-based Monte Carlo simulation, validating our findings with game theory. The Nash equilibrium encapsulates individuals' non-cooperative behavior, while the system's optimal value represents the societal benefits of altruistic cooperation. We define the difference between these as the price of anarchy. Our simulations reveal that the price of anarchy must fall below a threshold of 12.47 for endemic phases to be achieved in a steady state. This suggests that for a basic reproduction number of 10, a consistent vaccination rate greater than 89% is required. These findings offer new insights into vaccination-related decision-making and can inform effective strategies to tackle infectious diseases.