Attitude Moralization: Probably Not Intuitive or Rooted in Perceptions of Harm

Linda J Skitka,Mark J Brandt,Daniel C Wisneski

doi:10.1177/0963721417727861

Abstract

People vary in the extent to which they imbue attitudes with moral conviction, and this variation is consequential. Yet we know relatively little about what makes people’s feelings about a given attitude object transform from a relatively nonmoral preference to a moral conviction. In this article, we review evidence from two experiments and a field study that sheds some light on the processes that lead to attitude moralization. This research explored the roles of incidental and integral affect, cognitive factors such as recognition of harm, and whether attitude-moralization processes can occur outside conscious awareness or require some level of conscious deliberation. The findings present some challenges to contemporary theories that emphasize the roles of intuition and harm and indicate that more research designed to better understand moralization processes is needed.

Highlights

People vary in the extent to which they imbue attitudes with moral conviction, and this variation is consequential
We review evidence from two experiments and a field study that shed some light on the processes that lead to attitude moralization
These studies explored the roles of incidental and integral affect, cognitive factors such as recognition of harm, and whether attitude moralization processes can occur outside conscious awareness or requires some level of conscious deliberation

Summary

Introduction

People vary in the extent to which they imbue attitudes with moral conviction, and this variation is consequential. Discrete emotions and associated cognitive appraisals (e.g., recognition of harm) are thought to increase the salience of moral concern that will in turn only affect judgments related to the source of that concern (e.g., Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011). This theoretical perspective implies intuition may be necessary, but not be sufficient, to lead to attitude moralization: Recognition of specific attitude-relevant harm, may be necessary as well. This position is consistent with agent-patient theories of morality (e.g., Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012), as well as theories that argue that morality is connected to a desire to avoid moral harms and to approach moral goods (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013)

Objectives

Conclusion