Attempts, in Language and in Law

Abstract

Let us start with the particular. A shoots at V, intending to kill. Were the bullet to strike V, killing her, A would be guilty of murder. That is to say, A would satisfy the statutory definition of murder and could not plausibly invoke any of the available defenses to criminal liability. In the event, however, the bullet misses V, landing harmlessly in a field. Call this case Target Missed. Should A be convicted of some offense and criminally punished? If so, why? All criminal law regimes of which I am familiar answer that first question in the affirmative, and criminal law theorists (or Anglophone theorists at the least) are in possibly unanimous agreement. Indeed, few questions in the philosophy of criminal law elicit such widespread assent. There is far less agreement regarding the best answer to the second question—the question of what justifies punishment in Target...