Abstract
Quantum cryptography promises security based on the laws of physics with proofs of security against attackers of unlimited computational power. However, deviations from the original assumptions allow quantum hackers to compromise the system. We present a side channel attack that takes advantage of ventilation holes in optical devices to inject additional photons that can leak information about the secret key. We experimentally demonstrate light injection on an ID Quantique Clavis2 quantum key distribution platform and show that this may help an attacker to learn information about the secret key. We then apply the same technique to a prototype quantum random number generator and show that its output is biased by injected light. This shows that light injection is a potential security risk that should be addressed during the design of quantum information processing devices.
Highlights
In modern computer networks, users need fast and secure channels
We have shown that ventilation openings can be a problem for the security of quantum key distribution systems and quantum random number generators
External laser light can alter the photon sources in Quantum key distribution (QKD) devices and has been shown to weaken security either by seeding the source laser so that consecutive pulses are not phase-independent [75], altering the wavelength to identify the state choice [76, 77], increasing the mean photon number [23, 60, 77], or performing laser machining to physically alter the components inside the QKD setup [26, 61]
Summary
Users need fast and secure channels. Key distribution protocols based on computational assumptions, such as the RSA cryptosystem [1], enable the initial key exchange that these channels require. Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols [2, 3], like BB84 [4] or Ekert [5] protocols, and their research [6,7,8,9] and commercial [10] implementations offer a physics-based alternative. One of the assumptions of QKD is that the equipment is sealed from the outside, but this is not necessarily the case. In this Article, we show a new potential attack vector due to ventilation holes. We address the feasibility of ventilation hole attacks on quantum optical devices and show experimental examples of attacks on a QKD system and a QRNG in Sec. 3 and Sec. 4, respectively.
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