Attack and surveillance strategies for selfish primary user emulator in cognitive radio network

Abstract

Primary user emulation (PUE) attack is a serious security problem in cognitive radio (CR) networks. In PUE attack, attacker transmits an emulated primary signal during a spectrum sensing interval to fool the CR system causing a prohibition in the secondary access on the attacked channel. An attacker is called selfish attacker if it performs the PUE attack for its selfish own purpose. Since it is obligate to reveal the user's identification in any communication link, a channel surveillance process can help to identify the selfish PUE attacker. In this paper, we formulate a non-zero-sum game with incomplete information for analyzing and modeling the selfish PUE attack and surveillance strategies simultaneously. Nash Equilibrium (NE) is figured out in closed form. The results show that the network demand and the penalty factor strongly influence the NE. Numerical simulations confirm our claims based on our analytic results.