Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb against Japan

Abstract

Atomic Tragedy offers a unique perspective on one of most important events of twentieth century. As secretary of war during World War II, Henry L. Stimson (1867-1950) oversaw American nuclear weapons program. In a book about how an experienced, principled man faltered when confronted by tremendous challenge posed by intersection of war, diplomacy, and technology, Sean L. Malloy examines Stimson's struggle to reconcile his responsibility for the most terrible weapon ever known in human history with his long-standing convictions about war and morality. Ultimately, Stimson's story is one of failure; despite his beliefs, Stimson reluctantly acquiesced in use of atomic bomb against heavily populated Japanese cities in August 1945.This is first biography of Stimson to benefit from extensive use of papers relating to Manhattan Project; Malloy has also uncovered evidence illustrating origins of Stimson's commitment to eliminating or refining conduct of war against civilians, information that makes clear agony of Stimson's dilemma. The ultimate aim of Atomic Tragedy is not only to contribute to a greater historical understanding of first use of nuclear weapons but also to offer lessons from decision-making process during years 1940-1945 that are applicable to current world environment. As United States mobilizes scientists and engineers to build new and supposedly more usable nuclear weapons and as nations in Asia and Middle East are replicating feat of Manhattan Project physicists at Los Alamos, it is more important than ever that policymakers and analysts recognize chain of failures surrounding first use of those weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.