At the Limits of Religion Without Religion

Abstract

The central question of Jacques Derrida's Faith and Knowledge: Two Sources of Religion at Limits of Reason Alone is phrased halfway through essay: In its most abstract form, then, aporia within which we struggling perhaps be following: is revealability (Offenbarkeit) more originary than revelation (Offenbarung), and hence independent of all religion? Independent in structures of its experience and in analytics relating to them? Is not place in which reflecting at least originates, if not faith itself? Or rather, inversely, event of revelation have consisted in revealing revealability itself, and origin of light, originary light, very invisibility of visibility? This is perhaps what believer or theologian might say here, in particular Christian of originary Christendom, of that Urchristenum in Lutheran tradition to which Heidegger acknowledges owing so much.1 This is also arguably central question of Derrida's entire engagement with question of religion. The claim of essay is that question has been unresolved for years and now remains forever unresolved by Derrida himself. In what follows I argue that lack of resolution is not structural necessity, not part of Derrida's customary aporetic strategy, but result of formulation itself, bivalence that cannot on Derrida's own terms be resolved in either direction nor be allowed to remain indeterminate. There few occasions on which Derrida seems to have answered question with somewhat more certainty than he lets on in long passage above, and when he did, he did so in favor of conditions for possibility of revelation itself. The first occasion of which I take note is in context of Derrida's discussion of Promised Land, geographical figure that is diametrically opposed to desert. Derrida argues that Abrahamic revelations, religions, are not solely events. Such events only happen by taking on meaning of engaging historicity of history - and eventfulness of event as such (FK 48). This is fairly uncontroversial claim, but Derrida follows with much more disputable claim: the Testamentary and Koranic revelations inseparable from historicity of revelation itself. The messianic or eschatological horizon delimits historicity, to be sure, but only by virtue of having previously inaugurated it (FK 48). It is one thing to say that specific claims to revelation that constitute positive religions bound to historicity of revelation itself and even that positive religions delimited by historicity. It is quite another thing to say that messianic or eschatological horizon has inaugurated history. The question of which comes first, chicken of Offenbarkeit (revealability, conditions for possibility of revelation) or egg of Offenbarung (revelation) is quite decided at point in Derrida's mind. His preference for solution, however, is one that cannot be sustained, for reasons developed in essay. The resolution that Derrida puts forward at point in Faith and Knowledge rests on his exploration of a third place that could well have been more than archi-originary, most anarchic and anarchivable place possible, not island nor Promised Land, but certain desert, that which makes possible, opens, hollows or infinitizes other (FK 55). In desert, extreme non-place, there would still be possibility of religio and of relegere, to be sure, but before 'link' of religare ... also be like condition of 'link' reduced to its minimal semantic determination (FK 55). In site or non-site of undetermined responsibility before its connection to any specific faith, this fiduciary 'link' precede all determinate community, all positive religion, every onto-anthropotheological horizon. …