Abstract

Many observers have regarded reliance on the capacity to inflict widespread destruction as a necessary (if precarious and ethically questionable) strategy, which, nonetheless, appears to have prevented a recurrence of another general war of mass annihilation. Despite the limitations inherent in strategies of deterrence, the great powers have steadfastly relied on the strategy of nuclear deterrence. The era “beyond the Cold War” does not entail the necessary abandonment or reformulation of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, the relaxation of superpower tensions, accompanied by vigorous Soviet wooing of Western European opinion, has reopened many old internal rifts in the Atlantic alliance. The fragmentation of deterrence theory has accelerated even further since the Cold War has terminated. To organize analysis and refocus theorizing, Mueller critiques the ambiguous concept of deterrence and broadens it to include nonmilitary considerations.

Full Text
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