Abstract
We consider the loss of efficiency in competitive market mechanisms used to allocate network resources. We model large heterogeneous populations of users assuming that each user has a random utility function. We show that if the utility functions are bounded, the competitive equilibrium will be nearly as efficient as the social optimum with high probability as the number of users increases. This is the case for inelastic capacity as well as elastic capacity, under some standard assumptions. This result extends to a network setup where sources and destinations are picked at random. If, however, the utility functions are not bounded, then the loss of efficiency does not converge to zero. Collaborating simulations are also presented.
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