Abstract

Strong dispositional monism (SDM), the position that all fundamental physical properties consist in dispositional relations to other properties, is naturally construed as property structuralism. J. Lowe’s circularity/regress objection (CRO) constitutes a serious challenge to SDM that questions the possibility of a purely relational determination of all property essences. The supervenience thesis of A. Bird’s graph-theoretic asymmetry reply to CRO can be rigorously proved. Yet the reply fails metaphysically, because it reveals neither a metaphysical determination of identities on a purely relational basis nor a determination specifically of identities in the sense of essences. Asymmetry is thus not by itself sufficient for a solution to CRO. But it cannot even help to answer CRO when a model for the determination of essences is taken as a basis. Nor is asymmetry necessary for a reply, as property structures may well be symmetric. A metaphysics of dispositional properties as grounded in a purely relational structure faces serious obstacles, and the properties would not be fundamental. Since essence and grounding are notions of metaphysical priority, there can be no essentially dispositional metaphysically fundamental properties, and the prospects of a “coherentist” metaphysics of basic properties are dim. A modal retreat that refrains from a post-modal conception of essence and simply claims that fundamental properties play dispositional roles by metaphysical necessity is unsatisfactory.

Highlights

  • Strong dispositional monism and the circularity/ regress objectionStrong dispositional monism (SDM; 2007a: pp. 72–73) as defended by A

  • Lowe’s circularity/regress objection (CRO) argues that if, following SDM, it is assumed that all physical properties consist in dispositional relations to other such properties, no property gets its identity fixed, because the required fixation of identities “generates either a vicious infinite regress or a vicious circle.” (2006: p. 138) In reply, Bird maintains that the essences and identities of all properties can be “determined relationally rather than intrinsically.” (2007a: p. 139; 2007b: p. 527) Relying on R

  • It promises to provide a reply to sceptical challenges when it is construed as structuralism about properties

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Summary

Introduction

Strong dispositional monism (SDM; 2007a: pp. 72–73) as defended by A. A model-theoretic instead of an algebraic construal will do better justice to the wording of Bird’s claim; it will enable us to go beyond a thesis concerning relational identity and difference of objects in structures and establish a result specific to asymmetric structures that offers candidates for the purely dispositional identities of properties in the monadic, essentialist sense.. Any two possible asymmetric structures with different numbers of objects always differ with respect to which form descriptions they plainly satisfy In this way, Bird’s official supervenience claim, construed as SR, concerns relational identity and difference of objects in a structure, not monadic identity or essence. By (n-1)-fold existential closure, the description yields expressions of n different total-role properties that are uniquely possessed by the structure’s different objects

No determination of identity in the sense of essence is established
No metaphysical determination of identity is established
11 Conclusion
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