Asymmetry and China's Tributary System

Abstract

In his article, ‘Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System’, Zhou Fangyin presents an important and stimulating application of the game theory of patterns of interaction to China’s traditional diplomacy with its neighbors. 1 His analysis contradicts the realist expectation that the larger power would simply dominate smaller powers in the context of international anarchy. However, his explanation of the tributary system does not rely on a cultural explanation based on Confucian morality, but rather on processes of conflictual interaction that lead to mutual accommodation between China and its neighbors. Zhou rightly emphasizes the two-way character of the tributary system and the centrality of its basic idea for Chinese diplomacy. In contrast to John Fairbank, he argues that it is more than a diplomatic cover for a trade relationship. In contrast to the general assumption that tribute is a form of booty that a larger power requires from a smaller power, he emphasizes China’s primary interest in stabilizing its relationships with neighbors through concessions. Indeed, it appears from Zhou’s narration that China is at the disadvantaged side of tributary relationships: frustrated in conflicts and conceding to neighbors in order to pacify its borders. By providing a clear and plausible model for interaction and interesting, complex cases of processes through which to arrive at equilibrium, Zhou has, indeed, made a contribution to both theory and history. Perhaps, further progress can be made by separating the necessarily unique case of China from the general theory of relationships between large and small neighbors. It is certainly useful to view China’s diplomatic history from the perspective of an analytic model, but the necessary simplification may lose features of the Chinese situation that are unique but no less