Asymmetrical Marriage Systems

Abstract

THIS paper is a consideration of the association between the system of relationships between groups, and their economic system of production and exchange. It is based on ethnographic material collected by the author in New Guinea, and on material from secondary sources. I try to show that where is accompanied by prestations or payments of any kind, an asymmetrical system can occur. Such a system exists when there is an unreciprocated flow of women going in one direction and a flow of goods going in the opposite direction. This asymmetry can exist despite the fact that the people themselves view the relationships as symmetrical or reciprocally balanced. It can also exist without there being any recognition of the asymmetry in the form of a kinship rule of preferential marriage. There has recently been much interest in the subject of kinship systems which prescribe who shall marry whom, and which thereby structure an asymmetry in the relationships (Levi-Strauss 1949; Leach 1951; de Josselin de Jong 1952; Schneider and Homans 1955). I wish to distinguish between these rules of preferential and the pattern of marriages actually taking place in a society, which I shall call its marriage system. I show that it is possible for the system to operate in opposition to the rules of a society. Marriage systems can be of many forms. They can be reciprocating when two groups exchange women; they can be circular when a large number of groups intermarry and, on balance, each group receives as many women for wives, as it gives2 out women in to other groups; they can be asymmetrical when certain groups give out significantly more women in than they receive, while other groups receive more women than they give. By considering some of the general properties of an asymmetrical system, I wish to clarify the differences between the reports of Levi-Strauss (1949) and Leach (1951), and to show that their views of preferential rules, although different, are actually complementary since one is referring to circular systems and the other is dealing with asymmetrical ones. In his Structures Elfmentaires de la Parent6 (1949), Levi-Strauss demonstrated the existence of two sorts of sister-exchange underlying the rules of many primitive societies-the direct exchange of sisters between two groups (echange restreint) and the more general exchange of sisters where at least three groups are involved. This form, which he terms echange gineralist, in its simplest expression means that the groups are formed into a chain; each group gives wives to the next group in such a way that the first group receives its wives from the last group in the chain. The system which such a rule creates is a circular one, since all groups receive as many wives as they give out sisters. If, however, there is no gift of wives from the last group to the first group, then the system becomes an asymmetrical one.