Abstract
Asymmetrical influence of population is ubiquitous in human and animal societies. Based on this fact, we construct a setup of asymmetric influence of structured population, which is often put with the combination mechanism of tolerance and punishment when the dispute of unfair outcome happens, to investigate the evolution of cooperation. In detail, the structured populations are classified into two types: A-type players (strong players) and B-type players (weak players). A-type players are capable to decide whether or not to lower the fitness of B-type neighbors with punitive action due to the tolerance limits. This action affects the behavior of B-type neighbors in the evolutionary game. Based on our simulations, it is noted that the mechanism of punishment combining with tolerance in an asymmetrical environment can promote the evolution of cooperation. Furthermore, the lower threshold of tolerance with the looser punishment, the higher the level of cooperation; and the higher degree of tolerance with the stricter punishment will maintain the survival of cooperators. It is also worth mentioning that if A-type population is the key minority impacting the majority of B-type, they can favor affecting and further promoting the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary game.
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