Abstract
Since Downs proposed that the act of voting is irrational in 1957, myriad models have been proposed to explain voting and account for observed turnout patterns. We propose a model in which partisans consider both the instrumental and expressive benefits of their vote when deciding whether or not to abstain in an election, introducing an asymmetry that most other models do not consider. Allowing learning processes within our electorate, we analyze what evolutionarily stable strategies are rationalizable under various conditions. Upon varying electorate size, the partisan split of the electorate, and the degree to which an electorate takes underdog considerations into account in its payoff structure, we find that different equilibria arise. Our model predicts comparative statics that are consistent with voter behavior, specifically affirming a “size effect,” in which turnout decreases as electorate size increases. Furthermore, relaxing some of our preliminary assumptions eliminates some of the discrepancies between the predictions of our model and empirical voter behavior. In particular, our work demonstrates that misperceptions about the partisan split of an electorate may account for high turnout behavior .
Highlights
A problem that has plagued political scientists for decades without satisfactory resolution is the apparent irrationality of voting
The seeming irrationality of one of the most fundamental acts of democracy set many political scientists and economists into motion in an attempt to explain how rational individuals can vote with high turnout rates, even when facing non-negligible costs
While supporting high turnout equilibria, the minimax regret model has been largely discounted in the literature, with critics pointing out that a true regret minimaxer would be so risk-averse that he would never cross the street, even if the polling location were on the other side [10]
Summary
A problem that has plagued political scientists for decades without satisfactory resolution is the apparent irrationality of voting. Kaniovski and Mueller [21] try to explain these relationships qualitatively, claiming that electoral closeness and size reflect heterogeneity in an electorate, which in turn increases voter turnout Other studies use these results as evidence that voters are rational actors that follow Downs’ voting utility formulation, as their votes are more likely to be pivotal in small electorates and close elections. He notes that expressive behavior is not necessarily outcome-independent, which would have an effect similar to that of the Riker–Ordeshook model’s D term With this idea in mind, we posit a game-theoretic model for voting behavior that blends instrumental and expressive motivations in an attempt to better understand the dynamics behind voter turnout in partisan elections.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
