Asymmetric micro-dynamics in spatial anonymous public goods game

Abstract

A number of empirical studies have proved that human decision-making behaviors are bounded rational with external regulations and intrinsic motivations. In some situations, without information exchanges, an individual could make decisions only based on its own payoff, experience, memory and aspiration level. Such process can be theoretically expressed as the aspiration-driven dynamics applied in anonymous evolutionary games. On the other hand, from the perspective of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology, Prospect Theory qualitatively describes the bounded rationality of human decision-making behaviors under uncertain conditions. Here we explore a new approach to quantitatively construction of such bounded rationality by combining the aspiration updating rules in evolutionary games with the asymmetric utility value function in Prospect Theory. Monte Carlo simulations are carried out on a square lattice using the model of public goods game. The simulation results have shown that the level of cooperation at equilibrium states depends on the combined effects of synergy factor, individual greediness and sensitivity to gains and losses. Besides, the results give a reasonable explanation for the spontaneous emergence of cooperation among irrelevant individuals as well as the necessary conditions for the full-cooperation state. Furthermore, we argue that the study on human decision-making behaviors in groups requires more extensive and profound interdisciplinary researches.