Abstract
This article intends to fill a glaring void in the existing academic literature on the issues and challenges which stem not only from crafting, but also making asymmetric federalism work in northeast India. It examines the extent and limits to which asymmetric federalism—specifically under Article 371A of India’s Constitution—not only negotiates Nagas’ sovereignty claims over their land and resources and caters to the demands of democratic justice, but also the extent to which it consolidates India’s state-nation and democracy building in its northeastern periphery. Contending that the extant asymmetric federal arrangement in India’s polity stems from a centralist federal framework, the article makes a case for a more robust asymmetric federalism, which goes beyond this framework.
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