Asymmetric cheating opportunities and partner control in a cleaner fish mutualism

Abstract

How can cooperation persist if, for one partner, cheating is more profitable than cooperation in each round, while the other partner has no option to cheat? Our laboratory experiments suggest that such a situation exists between the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus and its nonpredatory client reef fish species, which actively seek cleaners to have their ectoparasites removed. Clients Ctenochaetus striatus regularly jolted in response to cleaner mouth contact, and these jolts were not linked to the removal of parasites. In addition, cleaners did not search for parasites but fed on mucus when exposed to anaesthetized clients, which could not control the cleaners' behaviour. Field data showed that clients often terminated an interaction immediately after a jolt. Client species with access to only one cleaning station, owing to their small territories or home ranges, terminated interactions mainly by chasing cleaners while clients with access to two or more cleaning stations mainly swam away. Thus, the chasing of cleaners appeared to be a form of punishment, imposing costs on the cleaner at the client's (momentary) expense. Chasing yields future benefits, as jolts were on average less frequent during interactions between cleaners and individuals that had terminated their previous interaction by aggressive chasing.