Abstract
I examine the noncooperative equilibrium of an asylum provision game in which asylum is an international public good. I show the game can generate multiple equilibria similar to those of the hawk-dove game; the hawkish country is less open to asylum seekers than the dovish is. An inefficient equilibrium is characterized by an underprovision, and a Pareto improvement brings the acceptance of more asylum seekers. I suggest the hawk could and would lead the dove to achieve a Pareto-improving international agreement if the hawk is made to honor the agreement. A non-interfering way to increase asylum provision is to ensure against the breach of such a voluntarily reachable agreement.
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