Associations between Justice Scores, Care Scores, General Negative Affect, and General Positive Affect and Gender of Undergraduate Students at Prince of Songkla University

Kasetchai Laeheem,Kanda Janyam

doi:10.5539/ass.v11n5p10

Abstract

This study investigated the association between the justice scores, care scores, general negative affect, andgeneral positive affect among male and female undergraduate students at Prince of Songkla University, Thailand.Data were collected from 2,668 participants who were selected by means of systematic random samplingtechnique and data analyses by calculating odds ratios and employing chi-square tests using the EcStat program.The results revealed that the justice scores, care scores, general negative affect, and general positive affect werestatistically significant associations with gender of students (p = .000). Male students were greater than femalestudents had justice scores and general positive affect at a high level and moderate level. Meanwhile more malestudents had care scores and general negative affect with a low level than female students.

Highlights

There is a lack of information that integrates emotional experience with moral theories
This study investigated the association between the justice scores, care scores, general negative affect, and general positive affect among male and female undergraduate students at Prince of Songkla University, Thailand
Could this phenomenon be true of moral development, since it has been theoretically related to cognitive development? If emotions are a powerful part of the experience of moral judgment, as Kohlberg (1974) and the Neo-Kohlbergians (Rest, 1986; Rest & Narvaez, 1994; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thomas, 1999) suggest, could affective experience be more than just an ancillary phenomenon that does not impact the actual decision-making process?

Summary

Introduction

There is a lack of information that integrates emotional experience with moral theories. This study applies the above theories of moral orientation (justice and care) to David Watson’s approach to understanding the role of affect in daily mood and temperament by investigating the types of affective experiences reported by adults with different moral orientations, as they engage in a moral decision-making task. The primary reason for such an integration evolved out of one of the most valid criticisms of moral theories: the charge that enough time and attention were not devoted to other aspects of moral functioning, especially the affective experience of moral development This criticism is in direct confrontation with Kohlberg’s insistence that his theoretical and philosophical foundations honored the entirety of human moral experience. Could this phenomenon be true of moral development, since it has been theoretically related to cognitive development? If emotions are a powerful part of the experience of moral judgment, as Kohlberg (1974) and the Neo-Kohlbergians (Rest, 1986; Rest & Narvaez, 1994; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thomas, 1999) suggest, could affective experience be more than just an ancillary phenomenon that does not impact the actual decision-making process?

Methods

Results

Conclusion