Assisting, But Not Dictating

Abstract

When reading a journal such as Science , one is easily seduced into believing that empirical evidence can resolve moral disputes. In his Letter “Human being redux” (16 Apr., p. [388][1]), M. S. Gazzaniga defends human embryonic stem cell research because of the vast discrepancy between a tiny ball of cells that can fit on the head of a pin and a live human being. J. T. Durkin (“The case against stem cell research,” Letters, 3 Sept., p. [1402][2]) minimizes this disparity by emphasizing that “[t]he embryo and the adult are different stages in the development of the human being.” By referring to empirical information, they seem to think that the right (good) social policy for stem cell research can be justified. G. E. Moore's philosphical position, known as the naturalistic fallacy, argues that “goodness” is indefinable, and therefore its meaning cannot be logically derived by empirical means ([1][3]). That is, our biological underpinnings cannot prescribe what is good and right. However, facts in combination with a democratic ethic can assist in determining a policy decision. Although individuals will differ in their opinions, a democracy can decide whether the benefits of embryonic stem cell research outweigh any disadvantages. Science can assist in making this decision, but cannot dictate it ([2][4]). 1. 1.[↵][5]1. G. E. Moore , Prinicipia Ethica (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1903). 2. 2.[↵][6]1. H. H. Kendler , Amoral Thoughts About Morality: The Intersection of Science, Psychology, and Ethics (Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, IL, 2000). [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.304.5669.388c [2]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.305.5689.1402a [3]: #ref-1 [4]: #ref-2 [5]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1. in text [6]: #xref-ref-2-1 View reference 2. in text