Assisted suicide, the inviolability of life, and the right to self-defense

Abstract

Summary In the debate over assisted suicide, some argue against the practice of assisting another in his/her suicide by appeal to the inviolability of human life; call such views inviolability of life views (ILV). Although there are several ways that one could defend ILV, one secular defense, a defense that can be found in Neil Gorsuch's book The Future of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Gorsuch, 2006), is as follows: human life is intrinsically valuable, and so we consequently have a duty to refrain from intentionally harming human life. Since assisted suicide, by definition, involves the intentional infliction of harm, assisted suicide is always inconsistent with the view that human life is intrinsically valuable. In this paper, I argue that the principle driving Gorsuch's argument – that we ought never to intentionally harm human life – is ambiguous. When clarified, the principle directs us to refrain from intentionally harming human biological life and human psychological life. I argue that it is not possible, in all cases, to satisfy both directives issued by the principle, rendering the principle problematic. In the closing section of the paper, I show that Gorsuch's principle is in fact consistent with some cases of assisted suicide. I suggest that suicide is, in some morally significant ways, similar to self-defense; just as it is at least permissible to assist in the self-defense of another, it is likewise permissible to assist in the suicide of another.